Russia and its western  “Near Abroad”
Map courtesy of Google Maps

Russia is becoming a major danger to the rest of the world on a par with ISIS because of their “Russian World” project. The term “Russian World” should be understood to mean that part of the world  culturally dominated by Russian civilization. Unfortunately, in the view of the Russian Federation’s President, Vladimir Putin, and a great many other Russians, Russia lost governmental control over a very large portion of the Russian World with the dissolution of the Soviet Union on the day after Christmas in 1991. What seemed like a Christmas gift to NATO and the West, was a chilling humiliation for the new Russian Federation. 

Russia’s New Reduced Circumstances and Their Russian World Project

The states lost from the Russian Empire, what the Russian’s often call their “near abroad”,  included all of the Baltic Sea states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; the Central Asia states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; the eastern Slavic states of Belarus and Ukraine; the Transcaucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; and all of the ex-Warsaw Treaty states of Eastern Europe. Sometimes the Eastern European states are left off the list since their cultures are generally not slavic. However, there have been times when Russians have referred to Eastern European countries formerly under Soviet control as being in their near abroad.  Also, the Wikipedia article on “Near abroad” notes

Some sources claim that the term was popularised by Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev in the early 1990s, referring to central and eastern Europe,^[1] however the usage of the expression is attested before Kozyrev became minister, giving translators hard time.^[2] Early attempts to translate the Russian term include “the concept of ‘abroad close at hand,'” “nearby foreign lands,” and “countries not far abroad.”^[2] As a result of the acceptance of the term “near abroad,” the word “abroad” has acquired the function of a noun in English.^[2]

In addition to that, it does not take much research on the internet to find posts like Charles Krauthammer’s on the National Review, Resisting the rising revisionist powers: finally, a first step, noting an obvious fact about the Baltic Sea and Eastern European states: Russia wants them back! The Baltic States were considered an integral part of the Soviet Union before it dissolved, and in fact they were part of the Russian Empire since the early 18th century. To insure their independence from Russia after the Soviet Union fell apart, the Baltic states joined NATO as soon as they could. And not only does Russia desire Eastern Europe back, it would appear the Russians threaten all of NATO at the same time.

Russia’s Probes on Its Periphery

Georgia

Russian military probes  against the states of their “near abroad” began with the Russian invasion of the Transcaucasian state of Georgia in August 2008. The major casus belli for Russia apparently was that Georgia was strengthening its ties with the West.

From the dissolution of the Soviet Union until the Rose Revolution of November 2003, the new post-communist republic of Georgia endured both civil and economic strife. The Rose Revolution, which was unusually peaceful for a revolution that changed the hands holding power, brought a decidedly pro-Western regime headed by Mikheil Saakashvili as president. From the Rose Revolution until the August 2008 Russian invasion, Russian-Georgian relations deteriorated steadily. What panicked the Russians into

invading were the very close relations Saakashvili maintained with NATO nations, including the United States. Backing Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists, both provinces having a large fraction of ethnic Russians, the Russian Army helped wrest the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia away from the Georgian central government, so that today they are de facto independent states. Before the end of the conflict the Russian Army temporarily occupied the Georgian cities of Poti, Senaki and Zugdidi close to the south eastern border of Abkhazia, and the city of Gori just south of South Ossetia and less than 50 miles away from the Georgian capital of T’bilisi. Before the Russians withdrew, the South Ossetians destroyed the ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia and both the South Ossetian and Abkhazi separatists were guilty of “ethnic cleansing” of Georgians in their respective provinces. In fact both sides of the conflict have accused each other of atrocities, and it is hard to distinguish which side has the greater claim to genocide. Consider the evidence provided by Human Rights Watch, and by a report from the British newspaper The Telegraph, and form your own opinion. Nevertheless, one fact is perfectly clear: the unleashing of ethnic hatreds did not occur until the Russians invaded.

To this very day, the Russians maintain military bases in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as shown in the maps above, but they have not reopened hostilities to take the rest of Georgia. Why not? This is a question to which we will return.

Ukraine

Following Russia’s military adventure in Georgia came the more recent, very similar adventure in Ukraine from February 27, 2014 to the present. The cause was also similar, with the Russian loss of their man,  Viktor Yanukovych, forced out of the Ukrainian presidency by the Euromaidan protests. The Ukrainians were threatening to remove themselves from the Russian orbit to associate themselves with Western Europe.

The word “Euromaidan” literally means “Euro[pean] square”. The protests against Yanukovych’s policies that would ultimately cost him his office started on the night of 21 November 2013 in  Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in the capitol city Kiev, and demanded closer trade and diplomatic relations with the European Union. Ultimately, many Ukrainians wanted membership for

Ukraine in the European Union (EU). Earlier President Yanukovych had been moving in that direction and had encouraged the Ukrainian Parliament to modify laws to make the Ukraine compliant with the EU’s criteria for membership. The EU and Ukraine had already initialed deals on free trade and political association in 2012. However, the Russians counter-offered with a deal considerably sweeter in loans and cheaper natural-gas supplies, and Yanukovych suspended preparations for the EU agreement on 21 November 2013. Immediately that night, the Euromaidan protests broke out. In the following days the protests expanded, with much fighting between protesters and riot police. Ultimately, Yanukovych and other high government officials fled the country to Russia in late February 2014, simultaneously with the invasion of Russian forces. Finally, a successor government under Petro Poroshenko signed the economic part of the EU association agreement.

Just as with Georgia, the Russians could not accept the loss of Ukraine from their orbit, especially not a loss to their arch-enemies in Western Europe. Their reaction in 2013 was to stir the pot of ethnic enmity between ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine (17.3 % in 2001) and ethnic Ukrainians (77.8% in 2001). The map below shows the distribution of ethnic Russians throughout Ukraine. The dark blue area of the peninsula jutting into the Black Sea at the very southernmost part of Ukraine is the Crimea, or the Crimean Peninsula, and the only Ukrainian area to be majority ethnic Russian. However, the slightly less dark blue areas on the eastern side of Ukraine, roughly the same area that is known as the Donbass, also have very large  ethnic Russian populations.

Proceeding with more circumspection than they did in Georgia, the Russians supplied pro-Russian separatist groups in the Donbass and in the Crimean Peninsula with modern weaponry and munitions. The introduction of Russian troops into the conflict began with Russian soldiers wearing fatigue uniforms that were totally unmarked with any insignia that would explicitly identify them

as Russian. For some reason they were described as “little green men” by the Ukrainians, rather than as Russian soldiers. The “green” part of the label is understandable, since their fatigues were green, but “little”? Perhaps the reference was to leprechauns. Very deadly leprechauns. When asked at a March 4, 2014 press conference about the identity of the “little green men”, Vladimir Putin denied that they were Russian, but instead they were “local self-defense units.”

Seizing both the entire Crimean peninsula and parts of the Donbass, the Russians declared Crimea as independent of Ukraine on March 18, 2014, and annexed it as a part of Russia on March 20. On March 28 Vladimir Putin finally confirmed that the “little green men” were Russian after all.

Heavy fighting pushed the lines between the two sides back and forth until a seemingly lasting cease-fire starting 1 September 2015. With minor outbreaks of fighting since then with no appreciable territorial changes, the ceasefire nevertheless seems to be holding.

Very recently, starting sometime this last August, the Russians started massing troops on the eastern Ukrainian border, perhaps as many as four divisions. As a result Ukrainian tensions over a possible second Russian invasion are rising.

There are several interesting and worrisome aspects of Russia’s military intervention into Ukraine. The first is Russia initially trying to erect “plausible deniability” about their participation in the fighting. It seems Russia may have learned from accusations of war crimes thrown their way in Georgia.

The second worrisome aspect is their use of the excuse of a perceived threat to ethnic Russians as a reason to militarily invade another country. This is an excuse they can reuse, for example for an invasion of the Baltic Sea States.

Third, is one motive for their actions being to prevent nations in their “near abroad”, countries they view as part of the “Russian World” over which they claim suzerainty, from realigning with Western Europe, as if the West continues to be their enemy. They can hold such a motive only if they view the West as an existential enemy. This discovery must certainly come as a shock to Barack Obama.

Another not-so-worrisome, even encouraging aspect of Russia’s actions in Georgia and Ukraine is the fact they did not go on to totally conquer and absorb those countries. Why? I will discuss this question in the section below on Russia’s internal political and economic problems.

The Baltic Sea States and a Direct Threat to NATO

The Baltic Sea States — Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania — hold a very special place  in Russia’s imperial ambitions. Until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, what eventually became those three states had been an integral part of the Russian, and then of the Soviet empire since 1710 (the Russian Empire acquired Lithuania in 1795) with a brief hiatus between World Wars I and II. After the communist February Revolution  of 1917 in Russia, the Russian Empire collapsed and the German Empire occupied the three states. With Germany’s defeat at the end of World War I, the Baltic states gained their independence, although they did have to defeat the Soviet Red Army to keep that independence. By the end of World War II, the Soviet Union — dominated by Russia — had regained possession of the Baltic States. The Baltic States had remained independent for all of about 28 years.

Then after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Baltic States, along with all of the East European countries, regained their independence yet once again. As rapidly as possible, the Baltic States joined the NATO alliance to ensure their continuing freedom from Russia. Now if Russia attacks them, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires all members of the alliance to go to war with Russia to defend them. At least part of the motivation for the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine was to prevent them from doing the same as the Baltic States to join NATO.

Yet if there are any countries a part of the Russian World, the Baltic States are founding members. Over the centuries that they were part of the Russian and Soviet Empires, many ethnic Russians had emigrated to the Baltic States, just as other Russians had emigrated to Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia. As of 2011, ethnic Russians made up 4.9% of Lithuania’s population, 27.6% of Latvia’s, and 24% of Estonia’s. Russia wants the Baltic states back as much as or more than any of the other ex-possessions of the Soviet Union.

In June of 2015 multiple news sources had quoted the Russian news agency Interfax as saying the Russian Prosecuter General had started an investigation into the legality of Russia granting the Baltic states independence. A finding that their independence was granted illegally would then give Putin a reason to invade. Given how Russia has been behaving in Ukraine and Georgia, the Baltic States have been on high alert, suspecting they will receive some kind of military blow. Russian military provocations have included incursions into Baltic state airspace as well as into other NATO airspace, and a military buildup on their borders. Also read here for  additional Russian provocations. Next door to the Baltic states across the Baltic Sea, Sweden has also been threatened with war should they decide to join NATO. Since the Baltic states have already joined NATO in 2004, this growing confrontation promises far more danger to the United States than the wars in Georgia and Ukraine.

In considering the Russian probes against the periphery of the NATO alliance (and we have left out their actions in Syria!), one can only conclude that the “Russia Reset” policy of Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama was incredibly naive and almost fatally wrong-headed.

Russia’s Internal Political and Economic Problems. Is Russia Stable?

This raises the question  if Russia can afford such an expansionist  foreign policy. In discussing Russia’s invasions of Georgia and Ukraine,  I explicitly noted Russia refrained from totally conquering those nations. After Russia delivered the message that member countries of the Russian World should stay away from alliances with the West, and had carved out pieces of those countries from which Russia could deliver painful new messages should Georgia or Ukraine forget the first, Russia backed off and did not pursue further hostilities. (Given the fact that Ukraine continues to cooperate economically with the West and that Russia is currently massing large numbers of troops, perhaps as many as four divisions, on Ukraine’s borders, Russia may be about to deliver yet another message to Ukraine.)

Why would Russia back off?

In fact, if Russia conquered those countries, they would quickly become a liability. Putin could expect a great deal of hatred from a large fraction of the conquered populations, and he would have to station enough Russian troops there to ensure the good behavior of the conquered. That would not be merely expensive in economic assets, but specifically expensive in military assets that could not be used against NATO.

This reflection points to Russia’s economic shortcomings, and if economic shortcomings grow, they inevitably are transformed into political weakness as the Russian population has to bear an increasing economic burden.

I have already written some on Russia’s internal political and economic problems in the posts Russia: A Classic Fascist Power, Putin’s Purges, Russia’s Weaknesses, and Is Russia Stable?. Rather than repeat some of that analysis, I would like to compare the economic strength of Russia against that of the United States. The appropriate statistic to compare, especially as it concerns the economic burdens of individual citizens, would appear to be per capita GDP.  I have already shown a plot of a country’s per capita GDP vs its Index of Economic Freedom for every country on Earth in the post Comparing the Economies of All Countries on Earth. I repeat that plot below with the positions of both Russia and the U.S. conspicuously displayed.

In fact, not only is the economic freedom of the U.S. much greater than that of Russia’s, the U.S. per capita GDP is 4.2 times that of Russia. The U.S. strategic advantage over Russia should the U.S. decide to seriously oppose Russia in time to apply its wealth to weapons development and in time to actually meet the threat should be obvious. However, for that to happen, the American people would have to actually make that decision.

Currently, Putin’s position and the stability of the Russian fascist political system appear to be secure. Once fascism is dominant and all economic and political power is centralized in the state, fear of state retribution looks to be a great stabilizer. Just look at how long the Soviet Union lasted from 1917 to 1991, or about three-quarters of a century! However, if under adversity and state mismanagement of the economy, the economy begins to fall apart, the Russian state could very quickly begin to crumble, just as the Soviet Union did.

Dangers for the West

As I was finishing this essay, I heard on Fox News that Russia is moving nuclear-armed missiles to the Baltic Sea port of Kaliningrad, Russia. Kaliningrad is a tiny bit of Russian territory that sits between Lithuania and Poland. Quickly doing a search on the internet, I found that the report was confirmed by a very large number of news posts, including a Reuters post, Russia moving nuclear-capable missiles into Kaliningrad: U.S. intelligence official. In the post reporter Jonathan Landay wrote

Russia’s reasons for shipping the 500-kilometer-range Iskander-M missiles to Kaliningrad “could be innocuous,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“They moved a similar missile system to Kaliningrad in 2014 for a military exercise. It could also be a political gesture – a show of strength – to express displeasure with NATO,” said the official.

On the other hand the Russians just might want to take advantage of a weak U.S. President before he leaves office and carve out some advances that also could weaken the unity and resolve of NATO. Time will tell.

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